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Abstract 
The growing literature on crowdfunding has mostly focused on the determinants of campaigns 
success, as well as on the legal and macroeconomic drivers of the crowdfunding diffusion as a 
mean to finance innovative projects. Still there are scant evidences on whether the returns for 
crowdfunders are consistent with the risk profile of crowdfunded projects. By studying 365 
European clean-tech projects which raised capital via crowdfunding, we show that once the 
country risk has been accounted for, the returns are not consistent with the risks related to the 
technology adopted by the projects. Behavioral factors like bounded rationality or the cultural 
dimension of investors may explain this apparent mispricing of risks. While projects’ returns 
are, on average, negatively related to risks, we find that projects offering better risk-adjusted 
returns attract relatively larger average contributions. Our results have important implications 
for understanding the drivers of crowdfunding returns and its sustainability, and particularly 
for its diffusion as an instrument to foster the transition to a low-carbon economy.   
      
Keywords: crowdfunding; clean-tech; technology risks; innovation financing; learning; 
renewable energy. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently emerging as an effective alternative to traditional entrepreneurial finance, crowdfunding 
has the potential to transform the financial landscape for young innovative ventures (Ralcheva & 
Roosenboom, 2016). Crowdfunding refers to a model in which crowdfunders invest their money 
in a (crowdfunding) project against a financial compensation (e.g. revenue, equity, profit-share 
scheme) or a nonfinancial benefit (e.g. new product acquisition, credit on an album). 
Crowdfunding allows entrepreneurial individuals and groups of primarily early stage initiatives 
and start-up to collect funding through the internet from a large crowd of investors and donators, 
often in exchange for future products, debt repayments or equity shares. However, because of its 
riskier nature, the supply of this type of financing is often insufficient compared to the demand 
from entrepreneurs. Such capital shortage for young entrepreneurial companies is usually referred 
to as “equity gap”. In fact, because of their lack of collateral, i.e., limited cash flows and absence 
of past track record, start-ups obtain bank financing more difficultly than larger and more mature 
firms (Ang, 1991; Berger & Udell, 1995; Chittenden et al., 1996; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; 
Cassar, 2004; Schwienbacher & Larralde 2010; Cordova et al. 2015a; Cordova et al. 2015b). 
Small crowdfunded projects can also play an important in the context of the mitigation of climate 
change (Hawkens, 2017; Grubler, 2012; Lovins, 2011), by enabling a more widespread 
investment in low carbon energy technologies (e.g. wind energy, solar energy, energy efficiency) 
which are important to reach both the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and the 
Paris Climate Agreement (Rockstrom et al 2017). 
Climate mitigation will require the development and the deployment of alternative energies with 
different levels of risk (WEF, 2017). Innovation may create crucial technological components, 
such as ICT-based smart solutions connecting a raising share of distributed generation and electric 
mobility to the grid that are key for the gradual transformation of the electricity infrastructure 
(Howell et al., 2017). In addition to the development of sustainable innovations, climate 
mitigation needs the deployment of alternative energies substituting for existent of fossil fueled 
power plants (e.g. coal, natural gas) or for new additional capacity. Even thought their growth has 
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been subsidized by the governments, uncertainties remain on the capacity to learn and to reduce 
costs for the different technologies (e.g., wind, solar PV) in order to become competitive against 
the conventional energies (Yeh & Rubin 2012; Rubin et al. 2015; Shayegh et al., 2017). 
Crowdfunding can play an important role to foster innovation in the energy system and to 
disseminate the investments in clean energy technologies across space, but these projects have 
typically different levels of risk whose impact on the financing remains largely unknown in the 
literature. 
The novelty of the crowdfounding phenomenon has spurred scholars to conduct more detailed 
research on crowdfunding (see Mollick, 2014) not just because of the inherent interest of the topic 
but also to help policymakers in the design of a well-functioning and efficient crowdfunding 
market, possibly leading to a significant reduction in the observed early-stage financing gap for 
new innovative ventures. In particular, crowdfunding can spur the investment in clean 
technologies with large benefits to the society and therefore it is important to understand what are 
the main drivers of the investment in these projects and how crowdfunders react to the unbalanced 
levels of risk associated to cleantech projects.  
The paper focus on the influence of the risk profile of the crowdfunded projects around clean 
technologies in the returns of investors. In particular, it aims to answer the question: are the 
returns of crowdfunded projects in clean-techs related to the risk of the projects? Prior 
investigations (e.g., Lin & Viswanathan, 2016; Harms, 2007; Van Wingerden & Ryan, 2011; 
Ordanini et al., 2011) has revealed that crowdfunding is driven by both economic and behavioral 
reasons. Economic reasons are likely to affect decisions in crowdfunding as investors expect 
returns from their investments. In ligne with the economic and financial literature, behavioral 
reasons refer to motivations that can result from cognitive biases (Thaler, 2005), bounded 
rationalty (Simon, 1955) or non economic optimal perceptions (Kahneman, 2003). The latter 
results of intuitions as opposed to rational reasons based on pertinent information available that 
investors consider to formulate decisions in order to maximize their economic returns 
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(Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, it is important to understand whether the returns for crowdfunders 
are consistent with the risk profile of crowdfunded projects in clean-techs.  
Using a dataset comprising 365 cleantech projects from 17 distinct European crowdfunding 
platforms, we conduct a granular investigation of the relations between returns and risks 
associated with the funded projects by controling at the same time for the characteristics of both 
the projects and the countries. Our findings show that once the country risk has been accounted 
for, the returns are not consistent with the risks related to the technology of the projects. We also 
find that, while on average there is a negative relationship between return and risk, informed 
investors are associated to the investments that have superior return/risk profiles. Our results 
contribute to the academic literature and the policymaking debate by challenging the perceived 
role of crowdfunding as a financially mean to support innovative sustainable projects.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the relevant literature 
on crowdfounding and technological risk. Section 3 describes the new database on cleantech 
crowdfunded projects and presents the main methodological approach. Section 4 presents the 
main results, and Section discusses our findings and policimaking implications. Section 6 
concludes about the crowdfounders’ behavior in presence of technological risk.  
 
2. Crowdfunding Success, Risk and Return 
2.1 Drivers of crowdfunding campaigns’ success 
The most recurrent definition of crowdfunding is the one provided by Schwienbacher and 
Larralde (2010). They defined crowdfunding as “an open call, essentially through the Internet, for 
the provision of financial resources either in form of donation or in exchange for some form of 
reward and/or voting rights in order to support initiatives for specific purposes”. The referring to 
crowdfunding as an open call on the internet has made many authors see crowdsourcing, the 
outsourcing of a given task to a large group of people in the form of an open call (Howe, 2006), 
as the antecedent to crowdfunding (Dell, 2008; Howe, 2008; Kleemann et al. 2008; Belleflemme 
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et al., 2010; Rubinton 2011; Poetz & Schreier, 2012). The only difference between the two being 
that instead of pooling labor resources, crowdfunding pools another factor of production: capital 
(Harms, 2007). The open call takes place on online platforms which provide the way for 
crowdfounding projects and investors to connect without standard financial intermediaries 
(Mollick 2014). In this direct interaction, potential investors can see the level of support from 
other project backers, suggesting that social information could have a role in the ultimate success 
of a crowdfunded project (Kuppuswamy & Bayus 2013).  
Another distinctive feature of this new financing phenomenon is that crowdfunding platforms, 
which provide all the means for investment transactions to take place - legal groundwork, pre-
selection, the ability to process financial transactions and so on (Ahlers et. al 2012) - not only 
have the potential to help crowdfunding seekers (the entrepreneurs) satisfy their financing needs, 
which makes crowdfunding alike micro and social finance (Harms 2007), but also to test new 
products and run new marketing campaigns (Lambert & Schwienbacher 2010, Mollick 2014). In 
this sense, crowdfunding draws inspiration from social networking, where consumers actively 
participate in online communities to share information and providing suggestions about new 
initiatives and/or brand (Ordanini et al. 2011). Moreover, when crowdfunding is used as a mean 
to demonstrate demand for a proposed product, successful initiatives become a signal to venture 
capitalists of a potential good long-term investment, possibly leading to additional future 
financing for project holders (Mollick 2014).  
Research conducted so far has both focused on the project holders and investors’ side and have 
mainly relied on data from reward-based crowdfunding platforms. On the one hand, sholars have 
investigated the reasons behind people’s decision to use crowdfunding platforms to raise funds. 
Belleflamme et al. (2010) found that raising money, getting public attention and obtaining 
feedback on product/service, are all relevant factors in motivating the launchers of initiatives on 
crowdfunding platforms. Seemingly, by conducting a grounded-based research, Gerber et al. 
(2011) found that the main reasons why entrepreneurs use these platforms are: to raise funds while 
maintaining full control over the project, to receive validation, to connect with others, to replicate 
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successful experiences of others, and to expand awareness of work through social media. Finally, 
Belleflamme et al. (2012) noticed that, when used to invite consumers to pre-order a product, 
crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to price discriminate: consumers who enjoy higher utility will 
pre-order the product and pay more with respect to later consumers, who will wait until the 
product is offered on the market at lower price. In their analysis, they concluded that this strategy 
is proved profitable as long as initial capital requirement remains relatively small, in contrast with 
crowdfunding through profit-sharing, where the benefits are higher when capital requirements are 
large. Cleantech are likely to be in this last category and, although the scarce empirical evidence 
is mixted (Kuo et al, 2014), we expect that the size of the projects increase returns for 
entrepreneurs and indirectly for crowdfunders as well. 
On the other hand, academics have researched the reasons that motivate investors’ decision to 
support crowdfunding initiatives. Harms (2007) conducted a questionnaire-based research which 
led him conclude that self-expression and enjoyment have an important role in the decisions. 
Beyond the overall benefit investors derive with respect to their contribution (economic value), 
the main motivations include the presence of a guaranteed tangible output of the project (certainty 
effect) and the degree to which the benefits of the project outcome serves a functional need of the 
individual consumer (personal utility). Van Wingerden & Ryan (2011) distinguished between 
intrinsic motivations - control of use of an innovation, improvement of current circumstances, 
enjoyment, and sense of involvement - and extrinsic motivations - financial reward. In addition, 
Ordanini et al. (2011) found public recognition and patronage also add up to the list. Therefore, 
we expect that crowdfunders price the projects on cleantech by also taking into account with other 
factors beyond returns and risks. 
2.2 Technological Risks 
Technological risks play an important role in the funder’s decisions to invest. Technological risks 
refer to technology “problems” that arise with the uncertainty surrounding the determinants of 
“performance, cost, safe operating latitudes, or failure modes” (Hartmann & Lakatos, 1998, page 
32). The lack of knowledge regarding technology problems dissipates with the deployment and 
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operation of a new technology that increases the data on actual performance, and on frequency 
and severity of technical failures. One important source of information is when a new technology 
such as a power plant reach its projected lifetime, as technologies that have a few units running 
or that have not been completely depreciated yet have a higher risk (Mazzucato & Semieniuk, 
2018). As Oxera (2011, page 19) puts: “A wide range of factors can be expected to affect discount 
rates for low-carbon technologies. Some of these, such as wholesale electricity prices and 
government policy, are extrinsic, in that they are outside the countrol of a particular low-carbon 
generation developer. Other factors—such as load factor, cost structure, or technology 
maturity—are an intrinsic part of, or inherent in, a particular type of technology. Overall, it 
appears that the maturity or deployment of a given technology is the dominant intrinsic factor 
that defines the overall risk perception for that technology.” 
Technology deployment reinforces the maturity of a technology and lowers its technology risks. 
These risks traditionally contributes to increase the requested rentability of the projects by 
investors (Oxera, 2011). The literature of technology lifecycle identifies several factors that come 
into play in the maturing of new technologies such as standardization, technology improvements, 
cost reductions and learning (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Peltoniemi, 2011). Learning, in 
particular, has important implications in terms of the investment cost of a technology that is a 
crucial component in crowdfunding projects.  
Learning refers to the reduction in the cost of the technology as a result of the increase in the 
number of units produced and accumulation of experience (Shayegh et al., 2017). The effect of 
increased experience in cost reduction was originally demonstrated in empirical studies in 
manufacturing (e.g., Wright, 1936, Arrow, 1971). Learning processes have been attributed to 
“doing” (Arrow, 1971) as well as to operating, implementing, copying, searching and building 
(Sagar & van der Zwaan, 2006; Rubin et al., 2017). In practical terms, learning curves are 
industry-level experience curves that expresses unit costs as a function of cumulative quantity 
(Yeh & Rubin, 2012). The learning rate indicates the percentage of cost reduction for each 
doubling of cumulative production. Weiss et al. (2010) review the historical learning curves for 
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more than 200 energy technologies for both energy supply and end use technologies, finding mean 
rates of 16% and 18% respectively. More recently, Rubin et al. (2017) examine dozens of 
scientific articles that published learning rates on 11 electricity supply technologies, revealing an 
overall mean of 14% (for one-factor models).  
Although the relation between cost reductions and experience increase has proven simple and 
robust, it has several limitations (Nordhaus, 2009; Rubin et al., 2017). One important limitation 
is the impossibility to distinguish the various sources that may contribute to learning, such as 
research and development (Söderholm & Klaassen, 2006; Rubin et al., 2017), social and political 
factors (Yeh & Rubin, 2012), geographic and temporal effects (Nemet, 2009), input price 
volatility, autonomous technological improvement and knowledge spillovers (Nemet, 2009, 
Nordhaus, 2009) or economies of scale (Wilson, 2012; Healey, 2015). In addition, learning is not 
a deterministic outcome of cumulative production increase, but rather depends on proactive 
industry-level efforts (Grubler, 2010). However, learning often lead to product design 
improvements, higher productivity, process efficiency, and lower perceived risks by users (Argote 
& Epple, 1990). In these terms, new technologies may become rapidly outdated with the 
successive release of better versions, impacting the rentability of the use of the previous 
generations.  
The severity of this vintage effect increases with the level of the learning rate. High learning rates 
imply larger levels of uncertainty about the evolution of the technology. These rates are indicator 
of the ongoing changes underway in the new technology, whose technical and financial attributes 
may alter as it evolves. More imature technologies, which are still in the early stage of 
development, tend to present higher learning rates (Grubler et al., 1999; McDonald and 
Schrattenholzer, 2001; Shayegh et al., 2017) and so a higher risk of technology failure and of 
changing market conditions. Therefore learning rates is a possible measure of the technology risk 
(see also Rubin et al., 2015).  
Technological risks are also recognized by the financial markets. Scholars have investigated the 
pricing and risks of technology stocks and assets, especially in the aftermath of the “dot.com 
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bubble”. Sadorsky (2003) firstly applies price volatility as a proxy of firm risk in the study of the 
macroeconomic determinants of technology stocks’ behaviour. Henriques & Sadorsky (2008), 
Kumar et al. (2012) and Sadorsky (2012) examine the dynamic relationships between the stock 
prices of alternative energy companies, oil prices, interest rates, and an index of 
technology, finding that shocks to technology have a large impact on the stock prices of 
companies. Clean-tech companies do appear to have more in common with technology companies 
than they do with fossil fuel based companies. These evidences, within the larger context of 
alternative energy companies and industry structure, indicate that “the success or failure of 
alternative energy companies often depends upon the success or failure of fairly specific 
technologies” (Henriques and Sadorsky, 2008). Therefore, the volatility of clean-tech stocks is 
assumed to depend on the risk profile of the underlying technological base there are using.  
On the other hand, the technological risk increases the potential of losses or no profits for the 
funders. Thus it is typically associated with higher expected returns to compensate investors for 
the higher risks. However, as discussed in the next section, funders may have motivations other 
than the strictly financial ones. 
2.3 Crowdfunding returns in clean-tech projects 
Crowdfunding has become an interesting financing tool for the energy sector. Renewable 
energy and cleantech initiatives especially represent unique opportunities and challenges for 
investors (Cumming, Leboeuf, & Schwienbacher, 2016). According to Pernick & Wilder 
(2007), “cleantech refers to any product, service, or process that delivers value using limited or 
zero nonrenewable resources and/or creates significantly less waste than conventional 
offerings”. Cleantech consists of a variety of technologies that include energy efficiency, 
recycling, renewable energy (wind power, solar power, hydro-electric power, geothermic 
power, biomass and biofuels), green transportation and electric motors (Pernick & Wilder, 
2007).  
Crowdfunding may be used to fill the funding gap of social ventures in clean technologies. 
Previous studies show how crowd investors typically are not concerned about collaterals and 
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business plans, but rather they share the ideas and core values behind these initiatives (Lehner, 
2013). Since crowdfunders often invest a small amount of money in multiple projects, they 
typically take into account not only tangible and economic benefits, but also social ones, as long 
as the funded initiatives have ambitious and noble goals which they share (Cumming, Leboeuf, 
& Schwienbacher, 2016). Renewable energy projects, in fact, couple attractive interest rates 
with the opportunity to generate a social and environmental impact (Heale, 2017), thus leading a 
growing number of people to invest in cleantech projects via crowdfunding platforms.  
The total volume of public and private investments in clean energy as asset class has been 
increasing in the last years. It passed from the $62 billion total amount of 2004 to $287.5 billion 
in 2016, namely fueled by the sharp fall in equipment prices, particularly in solar photovoltaic 
from China and Japan (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2017).  
Since crowdfunding is a relatively new phenomenon (Vulkan, Åstebro, & Sierra, 2015), there 
are numerous research gaps which can be filled, particularly by investigating the characteristics 
and the outcomes of crowdfunded projects in a specific sector. Previous literature on 
crowdfunding has been mainly conducted across different sectors, with the aim of describing 
this new way of financing its dynamics (Décarre & Wetterha, 2014), often focusing the analysis 
on some of the largest global platforms, such as Kickstarter and Crowdcube (Koch & Cheng, 
2016; Signori & Vismara, 2016). A common focus of those papers has been to identify the 
characteristics of the project’s sponsor firm which determine the success or the failure of the 
campaign (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2013). Gupta (2017) investigates the main 
economic and social factors that influence the financial performance of alternative energy 
companies, finding that it positively correlates with local market return, oil prices, technology 
stock prices and country’s characteristics (such as technology and innovation capacities of the 
country). However, at our knowledge, there has not been an assessment on the way that 
investments have been driven by non-economic and behavioral factors, specifically on whether 
crowdfunders treat and factor risk. 
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Behavioral factors influence decision making as it has been reported by the economic and 
financial literature. They include bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), cognitive biases (Thaler, 
2005), and non-economic optimal perceptions (Kahneman, 2003). Bounded rationality refers to 
the fact that agent’s decisions are limited by information availability, individual processing 
capacity and time to make the decision (Simon, 1955). Cognitive biases relates to incoherent 
and inconsistent rules that agents follow in their decisions (consumption, savings, etc.) that can 
have important financial consequences (Thaler, 2005). Perceptions and intuitions, as opposed to 
rational reasons based on pertinent information available, are considered by investors to 
formulate decisions in order to maximize their economic returns. As Kahneman posits: “The 
central characteristic of agents is not that they reason poorly but that they often act intuitively” 
(Kahneman, 2003: 1469). 
Prior empirical investigations corroborate that crowdfunding has been driven by both economic 
and behavioral factors (e.g., Lin & Viswanathan, 2016; Harms, 2007; Van Wingerden & Ryan, 
2011; Ordanini et al., 2011). Particularly in the context of crowdfunding campaigns with social 
and environment orientation, Lehner (2013) suggests that funders look not only at business 
plans or collateral but also at the ideas and core values behind a project. Indeed, several studies 
find that crowdfunders invest in social initiatives thought to be necessary and relevant (e.g., 
Belleflamme et al. 2014; Drury & Stott, 2011; Rubinton, 2011). However, Hörisch (2015), from 
a rational choice perspective, argues that projects with a social mission are comparable to 
collective goods which tend to be underinvested. That is, backers will be less likely to invest in 
such projects because those who did not contribute to the project will profit from it anyway. 
Therefore, the extant theoretical and empirical literature is ambiguous about the role of non-
economic factors in crowdfunding campaigns, and thus about the motivations of crowdfunders 
to treat and factor technological risk.  
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The aim of this work is to determine whether risk is factored (and to what extent) into the 
expected return of renewable energy crowdfunding initiatives. For that, we study a sample 
consisting on renewable energy projects that have been crowdfunded via European platforms. 
Crowdfunding platforms that posts projects in the field of cleantech tend to be specialized: they 
only support renewable energy initiatives, and their founders are often former investment 
bankers, consultants and professionals with substantial experience in the sector.  
The online platforms considered are all very similar in terms of business model. They allow the 
project’s sponsors to set a target amount of funding they intend to reach, and in many cases if 
the target is not reached, money remains with investors and the project is unsuccessful. Some 
platforms do remove the description of unsuccessful initiatives from the platform’s track record.  
Most platforms do not offer an English version of the website, and this suggests that they are 
primarily, if not exclusively addressed to a local crowd of investors. In principle, the 
geographical distance from the funded project home country should cease to matter to crowd 
funders, since an almost costless internet connection facilitates the matching of funds sources 
and uses beyond geographical borders. Nevertheless, previous studies on the geographical 
distribution of investors (Guenther, Johan, & Schweizer, 2016) provide a clear evidence of the 
still present sensitivity of investors to the distance between them and the funded initiative in 
equity (and lending) crowdfunding. In some cases, the platform has its headquarters in a 
different country, i.e., the call is launched in another country different from that of the project: 
around 5% of the projects selected consists of energy plants installed in African or South 
American countries, among which Namibia, Kenya, Ghana and Colombia. An objective of this 
work is in fact to investigate whether the country risk premium is incorporated or not into the 
proposed returns of projects. 
The crowdfunding campaigns included in our sample were launched from 2011 to June 2017, 
with a total project value ranging from €3,800 to €22,472,460. Our definition of cleantech 
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encompasses all the initiatives aimed at the material installation of energy plants and at the 
manufacturing of products allowing consumers to save energy, such as LED systems and other 
energy efficiency appliances. We discarded the crowdfunding campaigns aimed at supporting 
green communities and studies on clean-tech given their broad scope of investment. 
Each platform website discloses different kind of information to online visitors and investors. 
Once the crowdfunding campaign is terminated, different platforms keep track of the related 
data with different degrees of granularity.  All the selection criteria described above brought to a 
final sample of 365 observations, from a set of 17 platforms, 15 countries and different types of 
renewable energy, for a total invested amount of €191 million. The platforms considered are 
lending-based, specialized in clean-tech and without a specific focus on one type of renewable 
energy. 
We disentangle two distinct sources of risks: technological risk and country-related risk. As for 
the technology risk, we are only able to measure it category-wise (per technology). On the other 
hand, the country risk relates to the location of project plant or manufacturing facility. By 
identifying the country where the operations are located and the time when the related 
crowdfunding campaign is launched, we are able to quantify individually the level of country 
risk associated to each project.  
The quantification of the technology risk poses several methodological issues. We use two 
distinct approaches to quantify the risk profiles associated to the different clean energy 
technologies.  
The first approach is based on the learning rates of these technologies as reported in the 
literature. The learning rates summarizes all the history of the installations and costs of the 
technologies. Their level typically correlates to the stage of development (or maturity) and 
uncertainty around technologies (Grubler et al., 1999; McDonald & Schrattenholzer 2001; 
Shayegh et al. 2017). Appendix 1 shows the highly similar patterns of learning rates comparing 
with other well-established measures of technology risk from the literature (e.g. Oxera, 2011). 
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Table 1 presents the values for the learning rates assumed in this study, which are consistent 
with the recent reviews of the literature (Rubin et al., 2015; Weiss et al., 2010). 
As an alternative measure of the technology risk, we use a financial quantification extracted 
from cleantech market indexes trends, available on the Nasdaq Global Indexes website1 for 
almost all renewable energy categories covered in our sampled projects – namely, solar, wind, 
biofuels, natural resources, lighting, green buildings, green transport and hydro global indexes. 
For each index, data were available from October 2010 onward. The goal was to capture a 
measure of the risk deriving from the type of energy resource employed in terms of volatility of 
the corresponding index. Therefore, for each project, the technology risk is estimated by 
measuring the volatility of the associated index in the three years before the specific launch date 
of the crowdfunding campaign. Although very different in nature and sources employed, both 
the approaches used to measure technology risk deliver consistent results. 
 
Table 1 – Learning rates as a measure of technological risk 
Technology Learning Rate Source 
Efficiency1 0% Lovins (2013) 
Hydro 1,4% McDonald & Schrattenholzer (2001) 
Heat pumps 10% Kiss et al. (2012) 
Electric cars2 11,5% Bento (2013); Abernathy & Wayne (1974) 
Wind (US) 13,5% Edenhofer et al. (2011) 
LED3  16% IEA (2006) 
Solar PV 20% Grubler et al. (2012) 
1
 Includes projects both on “energy efficiency” and “production efficiency”. Assumed no learning rate because already economic 
using conventional technologies. 2 Assumed the same historical learning rates as for automobiles. 3 Assumed the same historical 
rates as for compact fluorescent light bulbs. 
 
To investigate whether the risk of the country where the project is installed is accounted for in 
the project’s return, we considered the time series of country risk premiums compiled by 
Aswath Damodaran at New York University2, according to the country where the energy plant 
or manufacturing facility is located.  
                                                          
1
 Green Global Market Indexes available at https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/Index/. 
2
 Country Risk Premiums available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
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Finally, in order to investigate the role of national culture factors we retrieve the cultural 
dimension scores from Hofstede et al. (2010) which are available from Hofstede's website. 
These scores are primarily collected by undertaking a psychological survey of IBM employees 
across countries between 1967 and 1973. About 88,000 IBM employees in 72 countries were 
surveyed as part of the project. Such results were further updated in 2010. It is worth stressing 
that the literature (Zheng et al., 2012; Hofstede & Hofstede, 2001) espouses that cultural 
variables are extremely stable over a long time horizon. The full list of the variables used in our 
work is reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2– List of Variables 
Variablea  Variable name Expected 
sign 
Source 
    
Internal Rate of Return IRR  Crowdfunding Platforms 
 
Net IRR – Net Internal Rate of Return NIRR  Crowdfunding Platforms, Country 
Risk Premiums from 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
 
Technology Risk – Proxied using 
learning curves, or, financially, as the 
standard deviation of specialized 
NASDAQ indexes weekly returns 3 
years before project’s launch 
TRISK 
 
+ Learning curves from literature (see 
Table 1); indexes from Bloomberg 
    
Log Project Size – Natural logarithm of 
the total amount collected in each 
project 
 
LSIZE + Crowdfunding Platforms 
Maturity – Maturity of the crowdfunded 
projects 
 
MAT - Crowdfunding Platforms 
Individualism – Degree of 
individualism in a country 
 
Individuality + Hofstede, 2010 
Long-Term Orientation – Degree of 
efforts towards forecasting future 
outcomes 
 
Long-Term 
Orientation
 
+ Hofstede, 2010 
Risk/return profile and average investment size    
    
Log Average Investment – Natural 
logarithm of the ratio Investment 
Amount/Number of investors 
 
LAV  Crowdfunding Platforms 
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Risk-adjusted Return 1 – Ratio of Net 
IRR and Technology Risk 
 
RAR 1 + Returns from Crowdfunding 
Platforms, Technology Risk as 
defined in Table 1 
Risk-adjusted Return 2 - Ratio of Net 
IRR and standard deviation of 
specialized NASDAQ indexes weekly 
returns 
 
RAR 2 + Returns from Crowdfunding 
Platforms, Standard deviation of 
NASDAQ indexes from Bloomberg 
 
 
 
Evidences from the data sample (Table 3) show that the target amount and, consequently, the 
amount effectively collected can largely vary. Returns and maturities can range from 2.5% to 
18% and from 0.5 to 25 years respectively, depending on the conditions linked to each 
initiative. Some of the platforms also provide visibility on the number of investors which have 
contributed to the funding of a specific projects.  
 
Table 3 – Summary statistics for variables 
 N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Amount 346 479609.1 1608976 1           
2. Target 192 521809.1 2361563 .747 1          
3. Maturity 331 7.308218 5.01302 -.137 -.062 1         
4. IRR 334 .055475 .018718 .203 .171 -.348 1        
5. N. of Investors 260 156.4538 155.995 .776 .421 -.207 .208 1       
6. Tech. Risk 323 .167477 .046462 -.270 -.225 .346 -.190 -.331 1      
7. Uncertainty Avoidance 365 61.66027 17.5707 .003 -.139 -.543 .033 .038 -.168 1     
8. Standard Deviation 315 .040221 .00505 -.170 -.198 .286 -.191 -.158 .904 -.141 1    
9. Individualism 365 72.49589 14.5243 .009 .093 .236 -.415 -.280 -.144 .229 -.150 1   
10. LT Orientation 365 65.50685 15.6626 -.011 -.113 .124 -.362 -.174 -.102 .367 -.092 .839 1  
 11. Indulgence  365 53.6137 16.1469 -.089 .053 .450 -.372 -.346 .020 -.030 .026 .742 .496 1 
               
 
 
Exhibit 1 represents the frequency distribution of IRRs for the projects included in the sample. 
The majority of the proposed returns is below 5%, a level that appears inconsistent with the risk 
profile of cleantech projects, especially for the ones using relatively immature technologies. 
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Exhibit 1: The distribution of projects’ returns by technology according to the internal 
return rates (IRR) of the projects 
  
 
3.2 Methodology 
We test the effects of technology risk, project size, and project maturity on the returns on the 
crowdfunded projects by running the following regression:  
 
 =  + 	
 +  + 
 + ∑  +   (1) 
 
where  is the IRR of project i net of the country risk spread of the location where the 
project is expected to be realized, 
 is a measure of the technology risk associated with 
project i,   is the natural logarithm of the crowdfunding target  for project i, 
 is the 
maturity of project i, and β is a set of control variables. 
We further investigate whether the relationship between risk and returns of crowdfunded 
projects is affected by the degree of investors’ rationality. With returns inconsistent with risks, a 
possible interpretation could be that bounded rationality of investors is preventing them to fully 
assess the risk/return profile of projects. On the other hand, with crowdfunders showing to be 
able to assess the risk/return profile of investments, the interpretation of crowdfunders seeking 
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extra-financial returns (besides the financial one) - such as the utility derived from supporting a 
social cause - would be corroborated.   
In our dataset we observe the total amount of financial resources gathered by projects as well as 
the total number of individual crowdfunders supporting each project. We are therefore able to 
compute the average investment size of the projects. With rational crowdfunders, we would 
expect the average investment size to increase with better risk/return profiles, ceteris paribus. 
We test this hypothesis by running the following regression:  
  =  + 	 +  + 
 + ∑  +   (2) 
 
where   is the natural logarithm of the average investment of project i with the average 
investment computed as the ratio of the total amount of capital gathered via crowdfunding and 
the total number of investors who contributed to the crowdfunding campaign.  is a 
measure of the risk-adjusted returns associated with project i. The variable RAR is modeled on 
the Sharpe ratio commonly used in the theory and practice of finance. It is a synthetic measure 
of the return on a certain investment adjusted to take into account the risk profile of the 
investment itself. We estimate RAR using two distinct specifications: for RAR 1 the 
denominator is the Technology Risk measure associated with the energy technology employed 
in the project, while for RAR 2 it is the standard deviation of the NASDAQ index related to the 
technology of each project in the three years before the launch of the crowdfunding campaign.   
We estimate the models with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions and use robust standard 
errors reporting t-statistics. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Net returns 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimations of the models. Model 1 provides our baseline results, 
which only considers the technology risk and controls for the country effects. The main coefficient 
of interest is 	 with the expectation that it is negative. This follows the hypothesis that 
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crowdfunders on average do not price the risks associated with the projects they fund. In 
particular, once the country risk of the projects has been accounted for, investors in cleantech 
crowdfunded projects do not (fully) factor technological risks in the returns they accept to receive. 
The coefficient for the variable is -0.080 (t-stat -3.51) indicating a statistically significant negative 
relationship between technological risk and the Net IRR. In Model 2, we only consider the target 
size and we control for the country effects. The coefficient for the variable is 0.005 (t-stat 2.67) 
indicating a statistically significant positive relationship between the amount of capital sought by 
crowdfunders and the Net IRR.  In Model 3, we only consider the maturity of the project and we 
control for the country effects.  The coefficient for the variable is -0.001 (t-stat -3.54) indicating 
a statistically significant negative relationship between maturity and the Net IRR. Considering 
the tenet of finance according to which, ceteris paribus, financial assets with a longer maturity 
horizon are riskier—and risk is typically associated with higher returns—, and that energy assets 
such as power plants (coal, natural gas, nuclear and so on) have often long lifetimes, during which 
several variables can change like raw materials or carbon prices, our results indicate that the risk 
profile of the projects as far as the maturity is concerned is not consistent with the offered net 
returns level. In Model 4, the technology risk, the size of the project and the maturity are tested 
together along controls for country effects. In this model, which has a good overall fit (with a R² 
of about 54%) only the risk associated with the technology type remains significant with a 
coefficient of -0.079 (t-stat -2,79).  
In Model 5 and 6, technology risk is measured using the volatility of the NASDAQ indexes 
associated with each technology. In Model 5, the financial measure of technology risk shows a 
coefficient equal to -0.839 (t-stat -4.74) indicating a statistically significant negative relationship 
between risk and the Net IRR. Finally, we test this new financial measure of technology risk along 
project maturity and size: the risk variable remains (highly) statistically significant with a 
coefficient of -0.566 (t-stat -2.32).  
We explore whether there are cultural and social dimensions that could moderate a lax approach 
to pricing correctly risks. In table 5 we investigate whether national cultural dimensions 
influence net returns of cleantech crowdfunded projects. In Model 1, we find a positive and 
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statistically significant relationship between Individuality and returns, with a coefficient of 
0.001 (t-stat 7.44). This is consistent with the view that society where individuals care less 
about others beyond themselves and their immediate families. Ceteris paribus, the projects 
crowdfunded in countries characterized by relatively high degree of individuality are positively 
associated with higher net projects’ returns. 
In Model 2, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between Long-term 
Orientation and returns with a coefficient of 0.001 (t-stat 8.24). This would consistent with the 
view that investors with a long-term perspective are more interested in the sustainability of their 
investment in the long-term horizon.  
Table 4 – Baseline results 
 Dependent variables: Net IRR 
 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 
Technology Risk  -.080***                  
(.022)                                  
   -.079*** 
(.028) 
-.839***                
(.177)                                  
-.566**                
(.224)                                  
Project Size (log)  .005*** 
(.002)              
 .001 
(.001) 
  .001 
(.001)                                             
Maturity   -.001*** 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
 -.001** 
(.000) 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 293 182 330 167 287 160 
R² .477                  .403                         .442 .537 .468                  .505 
 
In Model 1 and 4, Technology Risk is measured on the basis of Learning Curves identified in the literature (see Table 1). In 
Model 5 and 6, Technology Risk is mesured from a financial perspective using the volatility (Standard Deviation of the weekly 
returns) of the NASDAQ indexes associated with each specific type of energy technology; for each project the volatility is 
computed covering the three years before the project’s launch on the relative crowdfunding platform. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Notation of the significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 5 – Effect of the cultural factors on projects’ Net IRR 
 Dependent variables: Net IRR 
 
 1 2 
Technology Risk -.096*** 
(.030) 
-.083*** 
(.031) 
Project Size (log) .000 
(.000) 
.002** 
(.001) 
Maturity -.000** 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Individuality .001*** 
(.000) 
 
Long-term Orientation 
 
 .001*** 
(.000) 
 
N 167 167 
R² .456 .564 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notation of the significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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4.2 Risk/return profile and investment size 
We are able to identify two possible interpretations for crowdfunding returns not being 
consistent with the risk profile of projects: bounded rationality and cognitive biases like 
crowdfunders receiving a psychological return -along the financial one- from investing in 
projects that benefit society. In order to detect whether any of the two proposed explanations 
plays a role for different levels of investments, we analyze the relationship between the level of 
attractiveness of projects measured as average investment size by crowdfunders’ per project and 
financial quality in terms of risk-adjusted returns. If projects with better risk-return profiles are 
associated, on average, with projects that result more attractive to crowdfunders, then the 
interpretation of purely irrational investment decisions made by crowdfunders should be 
discarded for larger scale (more institutional) investors.  
In order to perform this analysis, we introduce the variable RAR which is modeled on the 
Sharpe ratio commonly used in the theory and practice of finance. The Sharpe ratio is a 
synthetic measure of the return on a certain investment adjusted to take into account the risk 
profile of the investment itself. Computationally, the Sharpe ratio is equal to the return minus 
the risk-free return divided by the standard deviation of return on the investment (Scholz and 
Wilkens, 2006). We compute the ratio using as numerator the IRR of the project minus the 
measure of the country risk. As denominator we use two different specifications: for RAR 1 the 
denominator is the Technology Risk measure associated with the energy technology employed 
in the project, while for RAR 2 it is the standard deviation of the NASDAQ index related to the 
technology of each project.  is the natural logarithm of the crowdfunding target for project 
i, 
 is the maturity of project i, and  is a set of control variables. 
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Table 6 –Regression analysis: average investment from crowdfunders  
 
Dependent variable:  
 
Log Average Investment 
 1  2 
RAR 1 .133***                
(.041)                                  
 
RAR 2  .210*** 
(.068) 
Project Size (log) .454*** 
(.040)              
.420*** 
(.040) 
Maturity -.053*** 
(.016) 
-.040*** 
(.015) 
Country Controls Yes Yes 
N 156 155 
R² .554                  .552                  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notation of the significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
In Table 6 we show that both the Risk-adjusted Return measures are positively associated with 
the logarithm of the average investments, the coefficients being 0.133 (t-stat 3.22) and 2.10 (t-stat 
3.08) respectively. This result supports the view that larger average investments by crowdfunders 
are associated on average, ceteris paribus, with higher risk-adjusted returns. Importantly, we are 
not claiming any causal relationship here but also an association. This result supports the view 
that larger crowdfunding investors are able, on average, to appreciate the risk/return quality of 
projects. Therefore, the interpretation of bounded rationality of crowdfunders is not (fully) 
corroborated for this category of investors. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
We run various robustness checks to ensure that the results are not driven by models or variables 
misspecification. In Table 7, we show the results we obtain by running the baseline model 
introduced in 4.1 with alternative definitions of the dependent variable. In Model 1 we use the 
straight IRR as reported by the crowdfunding platforms, in Model 2 the natural logarithm of the 
IRR is used instead. Finally, in Model 3, we report the results obtained when the natural logarithm 
of the Net IRR is employed instead. In each of the three specifications, the technology risk 
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variable is negative and statistically significant at a 5% level, while the other two variables are 
not with the exception of size (10% level) when the IRR is expressed in logarithmic terms.       
 
Table 7 – Results of the regression analysis: alternative measures of the returns  
 
Dependent variable 
 
IRR Log IRR Log Net IRR 
 1  2 3 
Technology Risk -.070**                
(.030)                                  
-1.132**                
(.480)                                  
-1.387**                
(.623) 
Project Size (log) .001 
(.000)              
.029* 
(.016)              
.024 
(.017) 
Maturity -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.010 
(.007) 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 167 167 160 
R² .379                  .403                         .440 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Notation of the significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 
5. Discussion  
This paper examines the determinants of relationship between technological risks and returns of 
projects crowdfunded. This is an important issue given the raising importance that 
crowdfunding is having in financing innovation and technology deployment at a moment of 
transformational change motivated by the need to avoid catastrophic climate change. We 
analyze a novel database composed of 365 projects on clean energy technologies of 17 
European crowdfunding platforms that raised a significant amount of capital from 2013 to 2017. 
The multivariate analysis includes variables that proxy technological risk with learning curves, a 
central measure of technology evolution in innovation and technological change studies (Rubin 
et al., 2015). The models also control for the influence of the characteristics of the projects and 
cultural dimensions.  
Technological risk turns out to be the most significant variable explaining the differences in 
returns of clean-tech projects financed through crowdfunding. This evidence is in striking 
contrast with the tenet of modern finance according to which returns are positively associated 
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with the level of risk embedded in projects. In financial terms, this means that platforms do not 
seem to price correctly the technological risk of the projects and concomitantly crowdfunders 
are accepting to take additional risks for the same reward. This behavior may be driven by a 
type of investors that evaluate clean-tech crowdfunding projects not solely for the associated 
financial returns but also for non-financial considerations such as the environmental and social 
impact.  
Early stage technologies, with typically higher learning rates (Grubler et al. 1999; McDonald & 
Schrattenholzer 2001; Shayegh et al. 2017), are surrounded by more uncertainties around the 
evolution of costs and profits, increasing the risk of losses or of no profits of the investment. 
Despite the increased risk, the analysis shows that crowdfunders accept to receive lower returns 
because of their different motivations to invest which may be related to bounded rationality and 
altruism. 
Overall, the inverse relationship between risk and returns and the consequent apparent 
mispricing of the analyzed project echoes the concerns about the estimated returns for equity 
crowdfunding by Signori & Vismara (2016). The authors find that expected annualized return 
for an initial crowdfunding investor is 8.8%, a level which is not consistent (lower) with the 
returns offered by venture capitalists (Gianfrate & Loewenthal, 2015).   
Project amount and maturity have little or no effect in the excess rates of returns. Only maturity 
presents some signs of significance, with predominantly a negative effect (but weak) on the 
returns. This counterintuitive effect again reinforces the conclusion that crowdfunders behave 
differently from more traditional investors in the sense that expected returns are disconnected 
from traditional drivers (risk or maturity). 
The characteristics of the countries play an important role in the definition of the premium rate. 
Cultural factors of the country hosting the projects have an effect on the returns. This is 
particularly the case of individualism (i.e., preference for loosely social connections, as opposed 
to collectivism) and long-term orientation (i.e., preference for encouraging and preparing 
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changes for the future, as opposed to resistance towards change), as defined by Hofstede (2010). 
These results confirm the early expectation about the positive and significant relationship 
between long-term orientation and returns. The positive relationship between individualism and 
returns is not surprising as either collective goals, such as environmental protection, receive less 
priority in a more individualist society and so we expected a positive effect of individualism in 
the rewards of clean-tech projects.  
The results have several implications for the policy-making and the crowdfunding research. 
Crowdfunding is raising across sectors and has the potential to enlarge the sources of financing 
for innovation and deployment of environmental technologies, especially for those in the 
formative phase that have scarce opportunities for funding its increasing needs of investment. 
Crowdfunding can also promote sustainable development by enabling the widespread access to 
clean technologies in low-income economies. Policies should seek to reduce the perceived risk 
of new technologies, particularly the dissemination of information to crowdfunders in order to 
raise the incentives (including the allowed returns) and the level of participation. 
In the future, we need to understand why crowdfunding platforms are not pricing correctly 
technological risk. Such investigation would eventually uncover important factors that drive the 
decision about the pricing of the projects, namely through the focus on more project level 
variables—such as the possibility to refund investors in case of failure to meet a target (Wash & 
Solomon, 2011)—instead of category level technology risks as explored in the paper. In 
addition, we need to understand how transformative emerging innovations, which have a typical 
high risk, high reward profile, could successfully find the means in the time and scale needed 
through crowdfunding. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper examines the effect of risk profile in the returns of crowdfunded projects. We study 
the projects that have raised money for clean technologies through crowdfunding in Europe, 
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from 2013 and 2017. These low carbon technologies are at different stages of development and 
have distinct risk profiles. This empirical case therefore allows us to improve our understanding 
about the drivers of the investment in crowdfunding, particularly in terms of the effect of risk in 
project formulation. We find that technological risks contribute to decrease the excess of returns 
of the projects, in contrast to the predictions from the standard finance literature. Altruism and 
bounded rationality partly explain that difference. In addition, we find that countries’ 
technological capacity and cultural dimensions significantly explain the variance in returns in 
terms of the differences of individualism and long-term orientation. We also show that while on 
average there is a negative relationship between returns and risks, larger average individual 
investments are associated to the projects that have superior return/risk profiles. These projects 
in turn have a large share of mature technologies.  
Implications of these results include the need to improve the conceptualization on the drivers of 
crowdfunding’s returns to incorporate behavioral factors. They also provide important lessons 
for policy-making to increase the investments in clean technologies with crowdfunding. 
Technological risk is not likely to limit the potential of crowdfunding to finance the 
development and deployment of low carbon technologies (especially by unlocking the potential 
of investment by a large number of microfunders). However, policies should improve the 
technological risk-adjusted returns of emerging technologies in order to attract larger investors 
that provide higher average investments. In the future, more empirical studies should analyze 
the effect of technological risk in crowdfunding projects in other sectors (e.g. medicine, 
pharmaceutical, information and communication technologies) to infer whether the pattern 
found in clean-tech is generalizable to the rest of the economy.  
Importantly, relevant implications for financial regulators and scholar emerge from our findings 
regarding risk profile of crowdfunded projects not being in line with the returns offered to 
investors. We lay the ground for the question on whether crowdfunding is a sustainable business 
model and whether it poses risks to the global financial stability and real economy. If that is the 
case, possible policies to be considered include increasing transparency requirements for 
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crowdfunding platforms, enhancing third party supervision, introducing independent rating of 
the projects, promoting the financial education of crowdfunders. Research is needed to 
understand whether and how mechanisms adopted in other areas of the financial system can be 
applied effectively to the crowdfunding sphere. In addition, research should also study the 
behavioral motivations of crowdfunders specifically in the context of the development of new 
sustainable innovations. 
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Appendix 1. Confrontation of learning rates (our study) with discount rates from Oxera 
(2011) as proxies of technological risk 
 
 
 
y = 3,3448x + 4,7069
R² = 0,9721
y = 8,4x - 6,3143
R² = 0,929
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